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FAMILY LEAVE LEGISLATION: ENSURING
BOTH JOB SECURITY AND FAMILY VALUES
I. INTRODUCTION
Family medical leave laws are intended to provide em-
ployees an opportunity to take leave from work for certain
personal or family medical reasons without jeopardizing job
security.1 The goal is to preserve the family unit in the wake
of the ever-changing job market.2 The amended California
Family Rights Act of 19913 (hereinafter FRA) and the Federal
Family and Medical Leave Act of 19934 (hereinafter FMLA)
both provide an eligible employee a total of twelve work
weeks of leave during any twelve month period for the follow-
ing reasons: the birth and subsequent care of a son or daugh-
ter, the placement of a child with an employee for foster care
or adoption, the care of a serious health condition of a spouse,
son, daughter, or parent, or for the care required for an em-
1. Robert M. Cassel, The Federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
and California's Family Rights Act of 1991, CEB CAL. Bus. L. REP. 29 (July
1993).
2. S. REP. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993). The Senate Report de-
votes an entire section to "The New Demands on Families and Workers," where
it lays out the profound changes which have taken place in the workforce. Be-
sides a significant demographic shift in the labor force, now consisting of 45%
women, the number of single parent households has increased dramatically. As
a result, a mother's employment is now essential to keeping families above the
poverty line. Another change affecting the workforce is the elderly, which is the
fastest growing segment of the American population, and a group which em-
ployees are currently providing home care for, at the cost of added stress on the
job. Id. at 5-7.
3. Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994). The Governor signed the FRA on September 30,
1991. The Senate passed the bill by a 24-13 vote on September 12, 1991, and
the State Assembly approved the bill by a 46-27 vote on May 13, 1991. The bill
was filed with the Secretary of State on October 1, 1991. The Governor signed
Assembly Bill 1460 on October 4, 1993. The Senate passed the bill by a 22-10
vote, and the Assembly approved it by a 62-12 margin. Assembly Bill 1460
amended Section 12945.2 of the Government Code and became effective imme-
diately. Id.
4. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, tits. I and
IV, 107 Stat. 7-19, 26 (1993). On February 5, 1993, President Clinton signed
the FMLA, which had been vetoed twice by the Bush Administration. Both
times, it was the House of Representatives that failed to override the Presi-
dent's veto. H.R. REP. No. 8, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 21 (1993).
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ployee's own serious health condition which has precluded
her5
Changing dynamics in the workplace compelled the pas-
sage of these laws. 6 As ever-increasing numbers of women,
who traditionally perform family caretaking functions, were
entering the workforce at an unprecedented rate, employers
were forcing many of these employees to make the unfair
choice between work and family.7 Indeed, it did not seem
work and family could successfully co-exist because there was
no policy which supported such an arrangement.8 Also, with
an increase in the number of elderly in society and a signifi-
cant increase in the cost of nursing care, many employees
have opted for homecare for these family members, as op-
posed to institutionalization. 9 Such caretaking, coupled with
nonstop employment, caused tension and conflict at home
and on the job. 10
The goal of the Family Leave Laws was to overcome the
challenges such employees faced. 1 As the problem grew, em-
ployer inaction resulted in employees looking to law-making
branches for a solution.12 The amended California Family
Rights Act and the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act
constitute a decisive legislative response. 13 The laws strive
to make family an active priority without jeopardizing job se-
curity. 14 The primary purpose of both laws is to create a pro-
employee "safety zone" where family and serious health con-
ditions are involved. 15 In fact, the FMLA implicitly encour-
ages the states to pass family leave provisions even more
5. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 102(a),
107 Stat. 9 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12945.2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
6. Family Rights Act, § 2 (1991); S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 5; H.R.
REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 16-23.
7. Family Rights Act, § 2 (1991); S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 7-12; H.R.
REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 16-17.
8. Family Rights Act, § 2(a) (1991); S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 7; H.R.
REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 31.
9. Family Rights Act, § 3(g), (h) (1991); H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at
23.
10. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 7.
11. Family Rights Act, § 2 (1991); S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 5; H.R.
REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 16-22.
12. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 7, 17.
13. See supra notes 3-4.
14. Cassel, supra note 1, at 29.
15. Id.
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favorable to the employee than its own.16 Congress realized
that "most of the safeguards for businesses now present in
the FMLA are the result of ... compromise,"17 and it did not
want those compromises to preclude employee-favorable pro-
visions. The intent of the amended FRA is clear, it repre-
sents an effort of the state legislature to "conform... the FRA
more closely to the employee-favorable aspects of federal
law."1 8
There are, however, provisions which undermine the en-
tire purpose of the laws. In particular, the FRA now provides
that an eligible employee who takes leave under the FRA is
guaranteed reinstatement to the "same" or "comparable" po-
sition, 19 rather than to the "same" or "equivalent" position as
provided in the federal law. 20 This comment proposes the
word "equivalent" be substituted for the word "comparable,"
as provided in the FMLA.21 Although the "comparable" stan-
dard has not been "tested" under the FRA, the Equal Pay Act
and its legislative history offer a persuasive solution to the
debate between "comparable" and "equivalent."
22
In addition, the FRA and FMLA both provide an exemp-
tion to reinstatement of highly compensated employees.23
Specifically, employees who are compensated in the highest
ranges within statutorily-delineated geographic regions are
not completely assured a job when they return from leave, an
assurance afforded other employees under the family leave
laws.24 Further, guidelines designed to serve as benchmarks
for such a situation are unclear and uncertain. The provision
will primarily impact working women, the group which will
take family leave most often.25 Specifically, those women
who are highly compensated themselves, or whose spouses
16. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 403,
107 Stat. 26 (1993).
17. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 86.
18. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
19. Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOVT CODE § 12945.2(a)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
20. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 104(a),
107 Stat. 12-13 (1993).
21. See discussion infra parts II.C., III.B.
22. See discussion infra parts II.C.1., III.B.
23. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 104(b),
107 Stat. 13 (1993).
24. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
9851995]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
are so compensated, will be adversely affected. This comment
proposes the exemption be eliminated to ensure all employees
are guaranteed job security under family leave laws regard-
less of their salary.26 History and gender studies, including
those cited in the legislative history of the FRA and FMLA,
provide strong support for this proposal.2 7
Finally, taking leave may unnecessarily compromise an
employee's privacy interests. The FRA and FMLA provide for
fitness-for-duty certification upon return from leave in order
to prove the employee can perform her job functions.28 With-
out requiring employers to initially demonstrate a reasonable
belief or doubt as to the employee's ability to perform her job
functions, the employee is needlessly denied reasonable pri-
vacy expectations which are not initially forfeited when an
employee takes family leave. Standards applied to random
drug testing policies provide an effective model.29
This comment addresses these inconsistencies, problems,
and adjustments. Although these provisions have not yet
been challenged in court, the goal is to obviate unnecessary,
and otherwise likely, challenges. As the primary group in-
tended to be protected by this legislation, employees must
seek clarification of these provisions to avoid needless
litigation.
This comment first provides the necessary background
information on the family leave laws themselves and subse-
quent information which will be utilized in the analysis to il-
lustrate the problems with some of the law's provisions.3 0
The analysis explores why these particular provisions as they
now stand are detrimental to the employee-favorable purpose
of the legislation and how these problems will manifest them-
selves in the workplace.3 ' Finally, this comment suggests
three proposals to remedy issues existing in the California
legislation so that job security and family values can co-exist
for employees who take family leave.3 2
26. See discussion infra parts II.D., III.C.
27. See discussion infra parts II.D., III.C.
28. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3,
§ 104(a)(4), 107 Stat. 12-13 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act,
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
29. See discussion infra parts II.E., III.D.
30. See discussion infra part II.
31. See discussion infra part III.
32. See discussion infra part IV.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History
The California FRA and the federal FMLA are grounded
in similar legislative findings documenting labor statistics,
the societal importance of job security, and the sociological
and economic importance of the family unit. 3 The purpose of
both the state and federal family leave laws is to favor the
employee by ensuring necessary family care and job security
without being unreasonable to the employer. 4 The purpose
of the legislation may be gleaned from the findings and stated
purposes of the FMLA and FRA,3 6 the Congressional re-
ports,36 and articles written on legislative intent of the
FRA.37 The provisions of the FMLA itself,38 discussed in the
following section of this comment, also provide insight into
the purpose of the family leave laws. This purpose provides a
foundation upon which the laws can be critiqued.
The findings and purposes in the California and federal
legislation provide a clear view into the window of legislative
intent. The findings describe the hardships employees face
regarding family leave.3 9 The purposes of the legislation are
set forth in an effort to help families facing those hardships.
40
In fact, none of the legislative findings in either the state or
federal laws document hardships employers have faced.4 '
Rather, Congressional reports document incident after inci-
dent where employees have been forced by their employers to
choose between their job and loved ones when faced with a
family medical emergency.
42
33. Family Rights Act, § 2-3 (1991); S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 4; H.R.
REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 16.
34. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 2.
35. See discussion infra parts II.A., III.A.
36. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
38. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, Title IV,
107 Stat. 26 (1993).
39. Family Rights Act, § 2-3 (1991); CAL. S. FL. ANALYsis 7 (Sept. 11, 1991).
40. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
41. Family Rights Act, § 2-3 (1991); CAL. S. FL. ANALYSis 7 (Sept. 11, 1991).
42. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 7-12; H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 24-
27. Both houses of Congress documented testimony about the need for family
leave. The House of Representatives, for instance, documented the following
personal story. In 1988, Ms. Lorraine Poole, an employee of a large municipal-
ity, testified to her heartbreak when she could not accept a long-awaited adop-
tive baby that had become available to her. Her employer told her that she
9871995]
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1. Federal Findings
The FMLA findings emphasize the importance of the de-
velopment of the family unit.43 Fathers and mothers must be
able to participate in early childrearing and the care of family
members who have serious health conditions.44 The lack of
employment leave policies which accommodate working par-
ents force them to choose between job security and parent-
ing.45 Today, 96% of fathers and 65% of mothers work
outside the home. 46  Yet, Congress found "numerous in-
stances where parents had to choose between bringing their
child to the hospital for much needed medical treatment and
evaluation versus losing their jobs [and] . . . [iun almost all
cases the employers were aware [of the situation] ....
Employees face similar obstacles when other family
members are faced with a serious health condition. Such
health problems are common amongst the elderly, the most
rapidly expanding segment of the American population.48
With the recent trend away from institutionalization, larger
would lose her job if she took time off from work to receive the child and the
adoption agency would not place the child unless assured that she would take
some time off to be with the child. Ms. Poole was left with no choice but to
decline the placement. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 25. The Senate Report,
too, documented testimony recounted at congressional hearings. Ms. Frances
Wright, despite 10 years of exemplary service, was fired after being diagnosed
with colon cancer. Treatments required her to take off about 12 weeks of work,
and she made efforts to schedule chemotherapy treatments on the weekends,
losing only one day of work due to these treatments. In her 10 years of service,
Ms. Wright had only been absent from work two other times. Despite her ef-
forts and service record, she was fired because of her serious health condition.
S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 12. These are just two examples of the extensive
testimony Congress heard regarding employer mistreatment and the need for
family leave.
43. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 16;
CAL. S. FL. ANALYSIS 7 (Sept. 11, 1991).
44. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 16.
The Senate Report documents expert testimony on early childhood develop-
ment, stressing the importance of infant-parent bonding during the primary
months of a child's life and advocating at least one parent have the necessary
time to care for a newborn "in order to create a strong foundation for the child's
later development .... enabl[ing] the parent to instill in the infant a sense of
confidence and of being an important person." S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 9.
Also, pediatricians acknowledged children's needs who have serious illnesses,
whose recovery is greatly enhanced by parental care. Id. at 10.
45. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 16
(1993); CAL. S. FL. ANALYSIS 7 (Sept. 11, 1991).
46. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 6.
47. Id. at 10 (quoting Dr. Stuart Siegal).
48. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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groups of elderly are being cared for by working family mem-
bers who need the job protection family leave laws are
designed to provide.49 Studies have found that conflicting
demands between caregiving and employment have caused
approximately 11% of such caregivers either to quit or be
fired from employment because of their caregiving function.
5 °
Further, job security is lacking for employees who have
serious health conditions themselves which temporarily pre-
vent them from working.51 It is also established that due to
the nature of the roles of men and women in society, women
bear the primary responsibility of family caretaking.
52 As a
result, caretaking affects the working lives of women to a
greater degree than it affects men.
2. California Findings
California legislative findings encompass all of the afore-
mentioned federal findings and more.53 For instance, Califor-
nia findings specifically state that more than 60% of women
in the United States of childbearing age are in the labor force,
and 40% of these women actually have a child under three
years of age.54 In conjunction, the findings state that close
contact between the parent and the child, especially in the
early years, is in the child's best interest and promotes family
stability.5 5
The California legislature also acknowledges a rapid
growth in the percentage of adults who care for their sick,
disabled, and elderly parents.5 6 Currently, there is a trend
towards home care for the elderly, which can escalate the ten-
sion between work and family.5 7 It is also established that
49. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
50. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 11. A recent survey revealed thirty-eight
percent of employed caregivers had to change from full to part-time work be-
cause of their caregiving responsibilities. The same survey found that 20% of
these caregivers suffered a reduction in their benefits. Id.
51. Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994); S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 11; H.R. REP. No. 8,
supra note 4, at 2, 26.
52. Family Rights Act § 3 (1991); S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 5-7; H.R.
REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 22-24.
53. Family Rights Act § 2-3.
54. Id. § 2.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 3.
57. Id.
9891995]
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elder care is principally provided by daughters, who jeopard-
ize their employment to provide such care.58
These findings illustrate the necessity of family leave
laws to combat the escalating incompatibility between work
and family demands. As both law-making groups noted,
before the passage of the FRA and FMLA, the United States
was the only industrialized nation which did not have some
kind of family leave provision.59 Consequently, employees
needed a means through which to reconcile work and family
because employers and unavoidable circumstances were forc-
ing a choice between the two. 60 An increase in the number of
working mothers made the problem all the more evident.6 '
Government responded by enacting the FMLA and FRA.
B. Relevant Provisions of the FMLA and FRA
In order to understand the proposals of this comment, it
is imperative to familiarize oneself with the provisions of the
legislation as it now stands. The FRA and FMLA both allow
eligible employees unpaid medical leave for up to 12 weeks
for the birth or adoption of a child 62 or for a child's serious
health condition,63 for the serious health condition of a par-
58. Id.
59. Id. § 3; H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 31-32.
60. Family Rights Act, § 2 (1991); S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 7-12.
61. Family Rights Act, § 2 (1991); S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 5-7; H.R.
REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 22-24.
62. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3,
§ 101(12), 107 Stat. 8 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(c)(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). The term "child" is used
in the FRA and "son" or "daughter" in the FMLA, but all the terms mean "a
biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a per-
son standing in loco parentis," who is under 18 years or is 18 or older and is
dependent due to a mental or physical disability. The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101(12), 107 Stat. 8 (1993); Moore-
Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(c)(1) (West 1992
& Supp. 1994).
63. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3,
§ 101(11), 107 Stat. 8 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(c)(7) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). "Serious health condi-
tion," as defined by both the FRA,
means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition
which warrants the participation of a family member to provide care
during a period of the treatment or supervision and involves either of
the following:
(A) Inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential health care
facility.
990 [Vol. 35
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ent 64 or spouse, 65 or for an employee's own serious health
condition which renders performance of job functions
impossible.
In particular, this comment discusses California Govern-
ment Code section 12945.2, also known as the Family Rights
Act of 1991.66 The FRA has been amended since its original
passage to reconcile the state law with the employee-
favorable aspects of the FMLA.67 The FRA, as it is now
amended, is the focus of this comment. Two titles of the fed-
eral Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 are pertinent: Ti-
tle I and Title IV, which address general leave requirements
and implementation.68
(B) Continuing treatment or continuing supervision by a health
care provider.
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101(11), 107
Stat. 8 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12945.2(c)(7) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
64. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101(7),
107 Stat. 8 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 12945.2(c)(6) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). Under the FRA, "parent" is defined
as "a biological, foster, or adoptive parent, a stepparent, or a legal guardian."
The FMLA defines "parent" as "the biological parent of an employee or an indi-
vidual who stood in loco parentis to an employee when the employee was a son
or daughter." The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3,
§ 101(7), 107 Stat. 8 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(c)(6) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
65. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-2, § 101,
107 Stat. 7-8 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12945.2(3)(B) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). The FRA defines "spouse" as "a
partner in marriage." The FMLA defines "spouse" as a "husband or wife." The
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101(13), 107 Stat. 8
(1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOVT CODE § 12945.2
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
66. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
67. Cassel, supra note 1, at 31. Assembly Bill 1460, which has become law,
is effectively integrated into the Family Rights Act California Government Code
Section 12945.2, currently referred to as Chapter 827 of this code. Chapter 827
of the Family Rights Act was passed in California to better integrate the FRA
with the FMLA. Most of the changes make family leave in California more
favorable to the employee. Changes pertinent to this comment include: amend-
ing the FRA to expand family care leave rights to employees whose own serious
health conditions require them to take leave; adding "placement of a child in...
foster care" to the list of occurrences for which an employee may request leave;
repealing the FRA provision that allows an employer to deny leave because of
undue hardship to the employer's business; and changing the limit on leave
from four months in a 24-month period to 12 work weeks in a 12-month period.
Cassel, supra note 1, at 35.
68. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, tits. I and
WV, 107 Stat. 7-19, 26 (1993). Title I refers to private employers and is entitled,
"General Requirements for Leave." The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
9911995]
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1. Who Must Comply
Employers need only comply with family leave laws and
accommodate their employees if they fall within the parame-
ters of the term "employer," as defined in the legislation.6 9
The term "employer," for the purposes of the FMLA, includes
"any person engaged in commerce in any industry or activity
affecting commerce who employs fifty or more employees for
each working day during each of twenty or more calendar
work weeks in the current proceeding calendar year."70 The
FRA defines an employer as "any person or individual who
directly employs, full or part time, fifty or more persons to
perform services for a wage or salary."71 In effect, if a com-
pany is an employer under one act, it will also fall within the
other, so it is important to reconcile the two laws and to clar-
ify what must be done to comply. The 1993 California
amendment to the FRA only partially eliminates such confu-
sion in its attempt to reconcile the two laws.72
2. Who Can Take Family Leave
In order to invoke the family leave laws, an employee
must meet specific eligibility requirements. For purposes of
the FMLA, an eligible employee is one who has been em-
ployed for "at least 12 months by the employer ... and for at
least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the 12
month period."73 The FRA uses the same standard for eligi-
bility.74 Both laws provide that if an eligible employee
desires to take leave, she is entitled to it. 75 An employer may,
Pub. L. No. 103-3, tit. I, 107 Stat. 7-19 (1993). Title IV is entitled "Miscellane-
ous Provisions", and contains such sections regarding the effect of the FMLA on
other laws, effect on existing employment benefits, and encouragement of more
generous leave policies than the FMLA. The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, tit. IV, 107 Stat. 26 (1993).
69. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101(4),
107 Stat 8 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12945.2(c)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
70. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101(4),
107 Stat 8 (1993).
71. Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12945.2(c)(2)(A), 12945.2(c)(2)(B) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
72. Cassel, supra note 1, at 35.
73. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101(2),
107 Stat. 7-8 (1993).
74. Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOVT CODE § 12945.2(a)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
75. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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however, require an employee who is taking leave for per-
sonal health conditions or serious health conditions of a par-
ent or child, to support her request for leave with certification
by the health care provider documenting the existence of a
serious health condition.76
3. Certification
The general certification provision is the same under
both the FRA and the FMLA.7 7 Certification must be pro-
vided in a timely manner and is sufficient if the information
provided includes the date the condition commenced, the
likely duration of the condition, an estimate of leave time
needed, and a statement that the serious health condition
warrants employee participation in providing necessary care
and support for her child or spouse.7 8 In the case of an em-
ployee taking leave for her own serious condition, the certifi-
cation must include a statement that the condition will im-
pair execution of job functions.7 s In both cases, the actual
illness need not be divulged, which protects the employee's
privacy interest.8 0 An employer may request a second opin-
ion at its expense, but only if the employer has reason to
doubt the validity of the original certification. 1 If the two
opinions conflict, a third health care provider, approved by
both the employer and employee, may be required to make a
final determination.
8 2
76. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 103,
107 Stat. 11-12 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GoV'T
CODE § 12945.2(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
77. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 103(b),
107 Stat. 11-12 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12945.2(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
78. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 103(b),
107 Stat. 11-12 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOVT
CODE § 12945.2(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
79. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 103(b),
107 Stat. 11-12 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 12945.2(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
80. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 103,
107 Stat. 11-12 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOVT
CODE § 12945.2(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
81. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 103(b),
107 Stat. 11-12 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GovT
CODE § 12945.2(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
82. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3,
§ 103(c),(d), 107 Stat. 12 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
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4. Reinstatement
Both laws expressly guarantee reinstatement after medi-
cal leave.83 The positions of the two laws diverge, however,
as to what standards govern reinstatement. The FMLA pro-
vides that any employee who takes leave under the act, upon
return from leave, shall be restored by the employer to the
"same" position of employment held by the employee when
the leave began or to an "equivalent" position.8 4 The FRA, on
the other hand, provides that an employee who takes family
medical leave shall, upon return, be restored to the "same" or
"comparable" position.85
5. Exemptions to Reinstatement
The FRA and FMLA both contain exemptions to the gen-
eral requirement of reinstatement in cases of highly compen-
sated employees.8 6 An employer may deny restoration to any
salaried employee who is a part of the highest paid 10% of the
employees within a seventy-five mile radius.8 7 To make such
a denial, an employer must show it is necessary in order to
prevent "substantial and grievous economic injury to em-
ployer operations." 8 Further, the employer must notify the
83. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 104(a),
107 Stat. 12-13 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 12945.2(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
84. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 104(a),
107 Stat. 12-13 (1993).
85. Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945.2(a)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
86. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 104(a),
107 Stat. 12-13 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12945.2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
87. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 104(b),
107 Stat. 13 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12945.2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). The FRA alternatively applies the ten
percent provision to a salaried employee who is one of the five highest paid
employees, or is among the top ten percent of the highest compensated employ-
ees, whichever is the greater number of people in that location. The FMLA does
not provide this alternative, and has only the ten percent provision. Since the
ten percent provision under the FRA will most often be the higher number, and
thus the standard used, this comment refers to this provision of the laws simply
as the "ten percent provision." It is also referred to as the "key employee" ex-
emption. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3,
§ 104(b), 107 Stat. 13 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12945.2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
88. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 104(b),
107 Stat. 13 (1993); Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 12945.2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
994 [Vol. 35
FAMILY LEAVE LEGISLATION
employee of denial of reinstatement when such denial is ex-
pected to occur.89 The FRA does not contain this notice re-
quirement, 90 but California otherwise mirrors the FMLA on
this exemption.91
6. Encouragement of Employee-Favorable Family
Leave Laws
The FMLA has additional provisions which serve as rec-
ommendations for states passing or amending similar legisla-
tion.92 Section 401 of Title IV encourages states and munici-
palities to pass laws which are even more favorable to the
employee than the federal legislation.93 The FMLA expressly
provides it will not supersede any state or local family or
medical leave laws which are more favorable to the em-
ployee. 94 Section 402 of Title IV provides a similar statute for
benefits, because though the FMLA is not an obstacle to
greater family or medical leave rights, it will preempt policies
which are less favorable to the employee. 95 Finally, an entire
section of the FMLA is devoted solely to the encouragement of
more generous leave policies than the federal act.96
The preceding legislative history and provisions of the
family leave laws provide a foundation for the provisions of
the legislation this comment examines. First, however, infor-
mation is provided which will be useful to an in-depth cri-
tique of the specific provisions of the FRA and FMLA dis-
cussed in the analysis section of this comment.
89. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 104(b),
107 Stat. 13 (1993).
90. Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
91. Id.
92. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 403,
107 Stat. 26 (1993).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 401(b),
107 Stat. 26 (1993).
96. Id. Section 403 of Title IV is entitled "Encouragement of More Gener-
ous Leave Policies," and states that, "[niothing in this Act or any amendment
made by this Act shall be construed to discourage employers from adopting or
retaining leave policies more generous than any policies that comply with the
requirements under this Act or any amendment made by this Act." Id.
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C. "Comparable" and "Equivalent" Standards
1. Federal versus California
The FMLA provides an employee taking leave will be re-
instated to a position which is the "same" as or "equivalent"
to the one she was in before her leave commenced. 97 Section
104 of Title I specifies that an employee who is not restored to
the "same" position must be restored to an "equivalent posi-
tion with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other
terms and conditions of employment."98 Further, the position
"must entail substantially equivalent skill, effort, responsibil-
ity, and authority." 99
California's FRA, however, provides an employee on
leave be restored to the "same" or merely a "comparable" posi-
tion.100 The statute defines a "comparable" position as "one
that has 'similar duties"' and is in a "similar geographic loca-
tion as the position held prior to leave."101
The United States Senate, in fact, was aware of the sig-
nificance of choosing the word "equivalent" over "comparable"
in the FMLA.' 02 The legislative records state clearly, "[tihe
standard of 'equivalence' not merely 'comparability' or 'simi-
larity' necessarily requires a correspondence to the duties
and other terms, conditions and privileges of an employee's
previous position."1 0 3 The federal regulations for the FMLA
state, "[t]he legislative history [of the FMLA] makes it clear
that the standard for an equivalent position is not 'compara-
bility.' "104 The House of Representatives directly addressed
the pre-amended FRA which had been passed two years pre-
viously and contained the "same or comparable" provision.1
0 5
It used the California law as a baseline and encouraged more
generous leave policies, regulations, and effective dates.10 6
97. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3,
§ 104(a)(1), 107 Stat. 12-13 (1993).
98. Id.
99. 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1994).
100. Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(a)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
101. Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12945.2(c)(4) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
102. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 30.
103. Id.
104. 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1994).
105. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 32-33.
106. Id.
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The difference between comparability and equivalence
standards, while seemingly insignificant, is substantial.
Lawmakers previously explored these differences when pass-
ing the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and these explorations ulti-
mately provide a useful means for analyzing the FRA and
FMLA standards for reinstatement.
2. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Effect of "Equal"
Versus "Comparable" Standards
The Equal Pay Act (hereinafter EPA), an amendment to
the Fair Labor Standards Act, requires employers pay equal
wages to men and women "for equal work on jobs the per-
formance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibil-
ity and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions."1 °7 Initial drafts of the EPA in the early 1960's
contained the following statement: "There should be no dis-
crimination between employees whose production [was] sub-
stantially the same on comparable jobs."10 With the compa-
rability standard, which the War Labor Board used during
World War 11,109 however, enforcement efforts proved "woe-
fully inadequate to secure equal pay even for identical jobs,
and standards governing comparability never developed."110
Legislative history of the EPA reveals Congress explicitly
rejected a comparable work formula in favor of the equal
work standard.1 In 1962, the word "equal" was substituted
for the word "comparable" in the House Bill.' 12 The following
107. Note, Equal Pay, Comparable Work and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J.
657, 664 (1981).
108. Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 88 DuKE L.J. 1207, 1227
(1988).
109. MACK A. PLAYER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 21 (1990).
The EPA was derived from the WWII's War Labor Board's "equal-pay-for-wo-
men" policy. At the end of the War, however, the War Board's authority ex-
pired. Consequently, "the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations
each sought to extend by statute the equal pay policy previously operative only
in wartime." The EPA was finally passed eighteen years later. On the wording
of the EPA, "[w]hile the wartime experience served as an inspiration for the
Equal Pay Act, Congress did not incorporate the 'equal pay for comparable
work' policies of the War Labor Board. Congress instead adopted a more strin-
gent 'equal work' standard." Id. (citing Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d
259 (3d Cir. 1970)).
110. Rhode, supra note 109, at 1227.
111. Equal Pay, Comparable Work, and Job Evaluation, supra note 108, at
666 n.55 (citing 108 CONG. REC. 14771 (statement of Rep. Goodell)).
112. Id.
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year, committee reports in both houses mandated equal pay
for equal work.113 That is, Congress adopted the "more strin-
gent 'equal work' standard."'14
In advocating amendment of the standards of the EPA
from "comparability" to "equivalence," one representative
stated,
If, in fact we want to establish equal pay for equal
work, then we ought to say so and not permit the trooping
around all over the country of employees of the Labor De-
partment harassing businesses with their various inter-
pretations of the term 'comparable' when 'equal' is capable
of the same definition throughout the United States."'
Another expressed, "[E]quality is one thing, but when we go
into these hazy words [such as comparable] it is another mat-
ter."1 6 Thus, it was suggested that comparability does not
give full equality, and this was where the fundamental differ-
ence between the two standards became clear. 7 Compara-
bility gave latitude to employers, and thus undermined the
main purpose of the EPA: equal pay for men and women.
1 1 8
Those who passed the Equal Pay Act studied the differ-
ent effects the standards of "comparability" and "equivalence"
would have in the workplace. The FRA and FMLA provide
for reinstatement to "comparable" and "equivalent" positions
respectively. The concerns raised in reference to the Equal
Pay Act provide a basis for discussing these two standards
with respect to family leave laws. Next, this comment pro-
vides the background necessary in understanding gender is-
sues which are affected by specific provisions in the FRA and
FMLA.
D. Gender Issues in the Workplace
Gender discrimination operates on many levels in the
workplace. A precise and dynamic definition of gender dis-
crimination continues to be the subject of vibrant discourse,
as women still try to equalize themselves in a work environ-
ment which has not historically been receptive towards wo-
113. Id.
114. PLAYER ET AL., supra note 110, at 21.
115. 108 CONG. REC. 14771 (statement of Rep. Goodell).
116. 108 CONG. REC. 14768 (statement of Rep. St. George).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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men. 119 Traditional beliefs based on the natural differences
between women and men continue to disguise themselves
and permeate the workforce, though perhaps indirectly.120
Until the 1960s, laws in the United States embraced and
implemented an ideology of "separate spheres" of female and
male activity, couched in natural differences between the
sexes. 121 The woman's sphere encompassed the hearth and
family. 1 22 Work outside the home dominated the man's
sphere. 123 Consequently, the United States maintained a
tradition in which gender directed the geography of life in so-
ciety. Generally, "men occupied the 'public' sphere of political
and commercial activity, while women occupied the 'private'
sphere of domestic life."124 Even during industrialization,
where significant changes were apparent outside the home,
"popular ideology sought to reaffirm the centrality of domes-
tic life"1 25 for women. Consequently, the women's movement
developed in the wake of a background which supported fun-
damental social, political, and economic inequalities between
men and women. 126 As a result, early employment policies
continued to emphasize the proper place for women was the
home, rather than the workplace.
127
These traditional stereotypes are no longer the norm.'28
The female labor force over the past forty years has increased
by approximately one million workers a year. 1 2 9 Currently,
fifty-six percent of mothers with children under the age of six
years, and fifty-one percent of mothers with children under
the age of one are in the labor force. 130  As of 1990, the fe-
male labor force increased by more than two-hundred percent
since 1950, and in the year 2000, two out of three new en-
trants into the workforce will be women.'1
3
119. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 9 (1989).
120. Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal Understandings of Work,
Parenthood, and Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective, 81 CAL. L. REV.
531, 557 (1993).
121. RHODE, supra note 120, at 9.
122. Wright-Carozza, supra note 121, at 557.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 11.
126. RHODE, supra note 120, at 9.
127. Wright-Carozza, supra note 121, at 553.
128. H.R. REP. No. 8, 103d Cong., 1st Sess, pt.1, at 23 (1993).
129. Id. at 22.
130. Id. at 23.
131. Id. at 22-23.
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Despite the influx of women into the labor force, alarm-
ing disparities between men and women exist, even at the
highest levels of professional status and financial achieve-
ment. 13 2 For instance, in the late 1980s, women were only
half as likely as men to be partners in law firms, claimed only
eight percent of state and federal judgeships, and filled only
two percent of executive positions in corporations in Fortune
500 companies."13 This low representation of women in top
paying jobs exists despite the steady increase of women into
the labor force.134
While some suggest that differences in career invest-
ments explain gender differences in earnings and occupa-
tional status,135 these suggestions presume that women se-
lect female-dominated occupations in order to balance work
and family.136 Such a conclusion assumes that female-domi-
nated jobs do not require "extended training, long hours, in-
flexible schedules or skills that deteriorate with absence."'3 7
This, however, is not the case. In short, standards of the
workplace, including employer practices, have emphasized
that a woman's proper place is in the home and not on the
job.13 8 Consequently, a husband, rather than his wife, is
more likely to hold a top position and, as a result, he will be
compensated at a higher rate for his work.1
3 9
Although there may be a new commitment to equal op-
portunity in employment, this commitment has not resulted
in equal domestic responsibility. 140 Women still act as the
primary family caregivers a majority of the time. 14 1 The leg-
islature responded to this problem by enacting gender-neu-
tral family leave laws, allowing both men and women to take
leave. 142 For husbands actually to take leave instead of their
wives, however, it must be not only desirable but economi-
132. ESCHEL RHOODIE, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 444 (1989).
133. Rhode, supra note 109, at 1210.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1214.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Wright-Carozza, supra note 121, at 555.
139. RHODE, supra note 120, at 167.
140. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 22-23.
141. Id.
142. Rhode, supra note 109, at 1216. The House Report states, "The right to
take leave applies equally to male and female employees. A father, as well as a
mother, can take family leave. ... " H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 23.
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cally prudent. 148 In other words, family leave laws must not
only be neutral on their face, but also in effect if they are to
overcome discrimination. 144 The manner in which the work
place has been structured, advancement criteria defined, and
domestic responsibilities allocated have all tended to perpetu-
ate gender inequalities. 1 45 The result serves as a confirma-
tion of the oppressive stereotypes that originally deterred fe-
male advancement in the workplace.
146
Some feminists view gender discrimination as operating
on "unconscious levels," and it is these underlying barriers
and cultural forces which these feminists advocate must be
redirected to solve the persistent problem of gender inequal-
ity in the workplace. 147 The crux of this theory is that "un-
conscious bias affects not only opportunities for individual
employees, but also reward structures for females as a
group."' 48 Consequently, these feminists advocate changing
male-designed occupational environments and the traditional
belief-systems which sustain such environments in order to
defeat gender discrimination.'4 9
Those legislators who passed the family leave laws ac-
knowledged the presence of the "traditions" women must
overcome. 150 Today, because the concepts of male and female
roles in society remain, family caretaking responsibilities still
primarily rest with women.15' Consequently, domestic re-
sponsibility affects the working lives of women to a greater
degree. 152 In fact, although women are no longer at home to
be the primary caregivers to children, elderly parents, and
143. RHODE, supra note 120, at 167. Because men are generally compen-
sated more highly than women, "it has been economically rational for working
couples to give priority to the husband's career, to relocate in accordance with
his job prospects, and to assign wives a disproportionate share of family obliga-
tions," which mutually reinforces outdated patterns when a woman's place was
unquestionably in the home. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 169.
148. Id. at 170.
149. Id. at 167. Gender discrimination will always, at a certain level, be rec-
onciled at the unconscious level if people never question why women were un-
equivocally directed to the domestic sphere in the first place. Id.
150. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 5-7.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Id.
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ailing spouses, these family responsibilities and expectations
have not diminished. 15 3
It is imperative to understand the dynamics of the role
women have played in society in order to predict whether
family leave laws will effectively provide job security without
jeopardizing family values for both male and female employ-
ees. The threat that the FRA and FMLA potentially pose to
employee privacy rights raises separate questions and also
merits discussion.
E. Employee Privacy Rights: Drug Testing in the
Workplace
1. Fitness for Duty Certification
One provision in the family leave laws provides employ-
ers the right to require an employee to present a fitness-for-
duty certification upon return from personal leave.15 4 Such a
provision, however, is problematic because these exams,
which may be required for certification, potentially interfere
with employee privacy rights. California case law addressing
privacy issues in the context of drug testing in the workplace
provides a useful analogy for analyzing privacy issues and fit-
ness-for-duty examinations under the FRA and FMLA.
2. Drug Testing in the Workplace
a. Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation
In Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation,55 appellant
Barbara Luck was fired from her computer programming job
when she refused to submit a urine sample as part of an
unannounced drug test by her employer.156 She claimed such
a test violated her right to privacy.' 5 7 The employer conceded
that it had no reasonable belief that Luck was performing her
job ineffectively. 158 The court concluded the constitutional
right to privacy prohibits employee urinalysis. 159 The court
153. Id. For instance, care for elderly parents is mostly provided by daugh-
ters, a majority of whom are jeopardizing their employment and potential ca-
reer advancement to provide such care. Id.
154. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(k)(1)(4) (West Supp. 1995)
155. 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990). The petition for review was denied
by the California Supreme Court May 31, 1990. Id. at 640.
156. Id. at 620-21.
157. Id. at 624.
158. Id. at 620-21.
159. Id. at 627.
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found, however, that such an invasion may be appropriate if
the state can show a compelling interest in drug testing.
160
In determining whether drug testing was a violation of
Luck's privacy rights, the court balanced Southern Pacific's
compelling interest in safety against the employee's privacy
rights.16 1 Given the right set of facts, the court indicated a
safety interest could be enough to tip the balance in favor of
drug testing. 162 The court, however, found no direct safety
dangers present in Luck's position as a computer program-
mer, and therefore, held that drug testing violated her pri-
vacy rights.1
6 3
The validity of an employer's safety interest can be deter-
mined by looking to job descriptions and focusing on the "im-
mediacy of the threat" to safety.16 4 The court said occupa-
tions where safety is involved include: one who works in a
nuclear power facility, one who is employed as a customs offi-
cial involved in drug interaction, or one whose job requires
her to carry a firearm.16 5 Significantly, the court stated indi-
rect risks on safety are not enough to find that a compelling
employer interest exists.
166
In addition to safety, factors presented by the employer
to support drug testing which the court did deem relevant,
although not present in the set of facts before it, included a
reasonable belief of abuse or poor job performance, and a con-
stitutional right or presumption of privacy. 167 The court re-
jected abstract justifications such as deterrence, efficiency,
and competence as compelling. 168 Creating a drug-free envi-
ronment, enforcing rules against drug use, and ensuring pub-
lic confidence in the integrity in the railroad industry were
also not accepted by the court as valid justifications. 1
69
Further, the court, in considering federal precedents,
stated that if the state employer's interests were "not justifi-
160. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 632 (Ct. App.
1990).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 631.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 630 (Ct. App.
1990).
166. Id. at 631.
167. Id. at 631-32.
168. Id. at 631.
169. Id. at 631-32.
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able under the less stringent Fourth Amendment test, a forti-
ori, they cannot constitute compelling interests under article
I, section I of the California Constitution." 7 0 The court con-
cluded that the employer did not articulate any clear, direct
nexus in relation to any of the compelling interests. 171
b. Semore v. Pool
In Semore v. Pool,172 the defendants were employee rela-
tions specialists for Kerr-McGhee, a chemical plant, who or-
dered plaintiff to take a drug test and terminated him when
he refused to comply. 173 On the issue of whether the drug
test violated the employee's right to privacy, the court de-
clared it could not decide the issue without knowing the na-
ture of the plaintiff's job.1 74 Because the plaintiff did not al-
lege the nature of his job in his complaint, the court had
insufficient evidence to balance the employer's compelling in-
terest, the safe operation of its plant, against the employee's
right to privacy. 175  In this case, the employer operated a
chemical plant, so its concern for safety was clear and legiti-
mate.' 7 6 The court, however, found it impossible to balance
these concerns without inquiring into the type of work the
particular employee performed. 177 Privacy rights must be as-
sessed on an individual basis.
The court did state that an employer "can always observe
its employees to see if [job performance occurs] properly and
safely." 178 An employer was permitted to take reasonable ac-
tion if an employee seemed to be under the influence of alco-
hol or drugs. 179 In such a case, however, employer action
must be rooted in a reasonable belief that an employee was
170. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 632 (Ct. App.
1990). Because the right to privacy is not explicit in the United States Consti-
tution, but it is under Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, Califor-
nia courts have universally held that if a particular practice is held unconstitu-
tional under the right to privacy implied in the Fourth Amendment, it is
automatically unconstitutional under the California Constitution. See id.
171. Id at 632.
172. 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1990). The petition for review was denied
by the Califronia Supreme Court May 31, 1990. Id. at 294.
173. Id. at 282.
174. Id. at 287-88.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 286.
177. Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 288 (Ct. App. 1990).
178. Id. at 287.
179. Id.
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abusing drugs on the job, a belief created via observation of
job performance.1 s°
C. Balancing Employee Privacy and Employer Concerns
Article I, Section I of the California Constitution grants a
specific right to privacy.181 Private employers in the state
also may not infringement on this right.'8 2 Consequently,
employment policies must not trammel on an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy."8 California courts have
recognized that the more stringent, express right to privacy
found in the California Constitution encompasses Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.1
8 1
Under the Fourth Amendment, random drug testing con-
stitutes a search because one has an actual expectation of
privacy, and society recognizes this expectation as reason-
able. 18 5 In fact, it has been held that urinalysis, the tradi-
tional means for drug testing, meets this criteria.18 6 Because
of this recognition of privacy rights, courts have usually re-
quired "some quantum of individualized suspicion" of drug
use before testing.1
8 7
Cases which have found employers do not need this indi-
vidualized suspicion often include a strong government safety
objective, and a situation where criminal investigation does
not motivate the government's inquiry. 11 In government,
these are known as administrative searches.1
8 9
Yet, even administrative searches have limits. In a pub-
lic employer situation, there must be a long history of accept-
180. Id.
181. CAL. CONST. art. I § 1.
182. Donald M. Remy, Note, The Constitutionality of Drug Testing of Em-
ployees In Government Regulated "Private" Industries, 34 How. L.J. 633, 636
(1991).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 637.
185. Id. at 637-38.
186. Id. at 638. Courts have consistently expressed that the general taking
of evidence from the human body involves an intrusion of a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id.
187. Id. at 642.
188. Id. at 642.
189. Id. at 644. The administrative search rationale, which allows an em-
ployer to constitutionally conduct an unannounced search, applies where there
exists a strong employer interest in conducting such a search and when the
industry is subject to extensive regulation, where there is often an inherent
diminution in employee privacy expectations. Id.
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ance by the public and the judiciary, and the government
must regulate such enforcement before drug testing is consti-
tutional.19 0 Additionally, there must be strong interest to en-
sure public safety.191 Finally, there must be limited invasion
of individual privacy. 192 Thus, the message is clear even in
settings where random drug testing is permitted-privacy
rights must be respected.
In short, the general rule for drug testing in the work-
place is that it may be legitimate to protect public health and
safety, but only if specific precautions and conditions taking
privacy into account are met.193 Concerning private employ-
ers, it is reported, "[a]lmost all of the companies (94.5%) that
perform urinalysis test job applicants and nearly three-
fourths of the companies [seventy-three percent] test current
employees on a 'for cause' basis."'94 Random testing is usu-
ally only allowed for positions in a "sensitive or high risk"
area. 195 The controlling reason companies without drug test-
ing have decided against it is employee privacy. 196 Similarly,
federal courts have not given a "broad endorsement" of drug
testing in the workplace. 19
7
Generally, district court cases striking down drug testing
fall into three broad categories: jobs which are not safety spe-
cific; 198 situations where the employer has no reasonable be-
lief of employee drug use;199 and situations where drug test-
ing is administered on a random, mass basis.20 0 Drug testing
has been permitted in situations where the employer reason-
ably suspected drug abuse 20 1 and reasonably and legiti-
mately determined the job categories in which testing should
be performed.20 2 When an employer claims it has a reason-
able suspicion of abuse which justifies the privacy intrusion,
190. Id. at 646.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Mark A. Rotherstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: the Challenge to
Employment Relations and Employment Law, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 683, 684
(1987).
194. Id. at 703.
195. Id. at 704.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 709-10.
198. Id. at 710.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 731.
202. Id.
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employers "must point to specific, objective facts and rational
inferences that they are entitled to draw from these facts in
[]light of their experience," a process known as testing on a
"for cause" basis.2 °3
The American Medical Association's position on em-
ployer drug and alcohol testing is that it should be limited in
the interest of employee privacy rights.2 4 Illustrations of
recommendations made which respect these rights include
limiting pre-employment examinations to those whose jobs
will affect other's safety and health.20 5 Also, drug testing
should be limited to situations where there is a reasonable
suspicion that employee's job performance is impaired by
drug and alcohol use.20 6 Finally, drug testing is acceptable
where it serves a monitoring function as a part of a compre-
hensive program of treatment for drug and alcohol
dependencies.2 °7
There are other views as to what constitutes an ethical
and effective drug testing program. For example, some advo-
cate that in order to have a drug testing program, there
should be "no feasible alternatives to detecting [job] impair-
ment .... 208 Also, testing should be limited to those employ-
ees who pose a safety risk not only to the public, but to them-
selves. 20 9 All of these limitations are designed to ensure that
drug testing by employers will not violate an employee's right
to privacy.210
This background information provides a basis for discus-
sion of the family leave laws, especially the particular provi-
sions to be evaluated. The next section initially analyzes the
history behind family leave legislation, which demonstrates
the pro-employee focus from which the laws can be scruti-
nized. The problems with three provisions of the California
and, in some cases, federal, family leave laws are subse-
quently examined.
203. Id. at 732.
204. Id. at 735.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 735.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 736.
210. Id. at 735.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Purpose of the Legislation: Employee-Favorable
In documenting the problems employees encounter in the
face of family exigencies, the legislative history does not ex-
plicitly state from whose perspective family leave laws should
be applied. An examination of legislative findings, however,
demonstrates that family leave legislation should be inter-
preted in an employee-favorable light. Analysis of the history
behind the FMLA and FRA supports this perspective.
The intent of the family leave laws focuses on remedying
conditions for employees. 211 In fact, out of the five expressly
enumerated purposes of the legislation, only one deals with
employer concerns, concerns which must first be deemed "le-
gitimate," rather than merely convenient or desirable, before
they will be recognized. 212 The remaining four focus on em-
ployees, particularly on balancing family and work by ensur-
ing job security so that family choice becomes feasible. 213 Fo-
cusing on the employee accomplished the legislative ends of
promoting the economic security of families, promoting the
national interest in preserving family integrity, providing se-
cured leave for medical reasons, discouraging employment
discrimination in the leave process, and promoting equal em-
ployment opportunities for women and men.
21 4
In setting out its purpose, the California legislature does
not even explicitly acknowledge the consideration of legiti-
mate employer interests.215 Instead, the findings provide
211. See supra notes 34-63 and accompanying text.
212. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 2(b)
(1993). The express purposes are as follows: first, to balance the demands of the
workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic se-
curity of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integ-
rity; second, to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons,
for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent
who has a serious health condition; third, to accomplish the purposes described
in (1) and (2) in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of em-
ployers; fourth, to accomplish the purposes in (1) and (2) in a manner that, con-
sistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, mini-
mizes the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by
ensuring generally that leave is available for eligible medical reason and for
compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis; and to promote the goal of
equal employment opportunity for women and men, pursuant to such clause.
Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 40-42, 54-59 and accompanying text.
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support for the pro-employee purpose of the legislation.216 In
addition, California made its act even more favorable to em-
ployees when it amended the FRA to include provisions of
the FMLA more employee-favorable than its own.217
Discussions found in the House and Senate Reports fur-
ther indicate the Congressional goals behind the legislation.
Both houses viewed family and medical leave laws as a neces-
sary minimum response to "economic and social changes that
have intensified tensions between work and family," since
voluntary corrective measures by employers had proven inad-
equate.21 8 In fact, when left alone to provide family leave pol-
icies, employers have acted irresponsibly. 21 9 The legislation
is designed to allow employees who need leave time to de-
mand it from their employers and get it as a matter of law.
Because of the changing dynamics in the workforce, leg-
islation is needed to acknowledge these changes, while simul-
taneously protecting the family unit.220 Both Congressional
Reports stressed the importance of parental participation in
early child-rearing for positive development of children and
the family unit.22 ' Family leave allows this participation to
become a reality. Similar social tensions exist when the focus
is on the caretaking of the elderly or family members with
serious health conditions.222 Congress stressed the impor-
tance of participation by family members in the care of other
216. Family Rights Act, § 2-3 (1991). Sections two and three of the Family
Rights Act of 1991 are presented before the statute documenting legislative
findings and purposes of the law to be enacted. In the findings of the FRA,
section two is devoted to the tension between parenting and employment, espe-
dally with the increase in the numbers of women entering the workforce, while
the other section of legislative findings, section three is devoted solely to the
stress of maintaining job security while caring for an elderly parent or spouse
with serious health conditions. Id.
217. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
218. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 4.
219. Id. at 5. There is also the problem created for those employers who
have acted responsibly, and have provided some sort of leave policy for their
employees without government-imposed minimum standards. Consequently,
another reason labor standards regulating family leave are necessary is "to re-
lieve the competitive pressure placed on responsible employers by employers
who act irresponsibly... so that conscientious employers are not forced to com-
pete with unscrupulous employers." Id.
220. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
221. Family Rights Act, § 2(e) (1991).
222. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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family members with serious health conditions.223 These
central objectives must not be compromised as employers im-
plement the FRA and FMLA. Family leave serves no purpose
if employees remain, in practice, forced to choose between
work and family when confronted with situations supposedly
protected by the family leave laws.
Further, employees are entitled to job security should
they have to take leave for their own serious illness. Con-
gressional records say, "The fundamental rationale for such
a policy is that it is unfair for an employee to be terminated
when he or she is struck with a serious illness and is not ca-
pable of working."224 Employers should not be allowed to
capitalize on an employee's serious health condition as a
means of excusing their obligations as employers. 226 Family
leave laws deny employers those means and favor the em-
ployee on this issue. To ensure that the laws are carried out
accordingly, their interpretation, must also reflect this
emphasis.
Overall, families are weakened if they cannot perform
their caretaking, child rearing, and economic functions. As a
result, individuals become irreparably damaged and, ulti-
mately, society at large suffers adverse consequences.226 Be-
cause of the lack of employment policies, the family leave leg-
islation seeks to "accommodate . . . the important societal
interest in assisting families by establishing minimum labor
standards for leave."227 The language of federal family leave
law is to be interpreted broadly,228 and encourages states to
pass more generous leave policies, regulations, and effective
dates than provided in the federal legislation.229 As one Rep-
resentative stated, "Most of the safeguards for businesses
now present in the FMLA are the result of extensive negotia-
tion and compromise."23 ° Consequently, states less inhibited
223. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 10. In fact, one pediatrician testified to
Congress that the recovery of seriously ill children is significantly enhanced
because of parental care. Id.
224. Id. at 11.
225. Id. at 12.
226. Id. at 7. For instance, employees who are able to take family leave and
keep their jobs are more loyal and skilled. As a result, society is not paying
welfare and unemployment benefits to these families. Id. at 16.
227. Id. at 4.
228. See supra notes 93-97.
229. See supra notes 93-97.
230. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 4, at 17.
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by such pressures should take the initiative and give employ-
ees even greater safeguards to ensure job security.
California, too, realizes the importance of supporting em-
ployees. The FRA adopts the purpose of the FMLA in seeking
to "eliminate the necessity for employees to choose between
job security and family exigencies."23 1 The pro-employee pur-
pose is undisputed in the Senate majority position that,
"[w]orkers should not have to choose between the welfare of
their children, their parents who need care and a
paycheck." 232 California has applied its pro-employee atti-
tude in amending the FRA in an effort to conform "the FRA
more closely to employee-favorable aspects of federal law."
2 33
California has recognized the challenge of the FMLA to enact
more employee-favorable leave policies.
Legislative history on the federal and state level docu-
ments the legislative recognition of a need for employees to be
able to take family leave without employer interference.
From this pro-employee perspective, the family leave laws
can be critiqued.
B. Problems with the "Comparability" Standard in the
California FRA
Mandatory reinstatement provides the linchpin of family
leave laws because it promotes family well-being without
jeopardizing job security. Without a guarantee of reinstate-
ment to the same position an employee had when she took
leave, objectives of family leave laws cannot be achieved.
The FMLA is drafted to ensure reinstatement. The
FMLA provides that an employee shall be restored to the
"same" or "equivalent" position she held prior to leave.2 3 4
Specifically, the standard for equivalency is not open-ended,
suggesting strict application. Indeed, "equivalent" means
"identical," a synonym for "same."235 The FMLA clearly uses
"same" or "equivalent" in the statute, and in defining how to
apply the standard never substitutes other terms.236 Be-
cause "same" and "equivalent" are synonyms, the expecta-
231. Cassel, supra note 1, at 29.
232. CAL. S. FL. ANALYSIS 7 (Sept. 11, 1991).
233. Cassel, supra note 1, at 30.
234. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
235. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 376 (6th ed. 1991).
236. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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tions of the employee and employer are clear, and reinstate-
ment standards are objective and can be applied
evenhandedly.
The FRA, however, provides that an employee shall be
restored to employment to the "same" or "comparable" posi-
tion.2 7 "Comparability" may ultimately jeopardize job secur-
ity by providing a means by which employers can impair that
security. The danger stems from the fact that "same" and
"comparable" require different analysis, for a comparable job
may not be necessarily the same or an equivalent one.
Whether something is comparable to another requires an in-
herent degree of subjectivity, which results in uncertainty for
the employee.
The FRA defines a comparable job as one with "similar
duties" and a "similar geographic location."238 "Similar," as
with "comparable," also requires subjective interpretations.
How many similarities must exist between one job and an-
other before it is "comparable" remain unclear. Comparabil-
ity gives employers an opportunity to set ambiguous, and
often pro-employer, standards for reinstatement.
Although the California law may appear just as
favorable as the FMLA, the danger lies in its potential effect.
This grey area must be clarified so as to circumvent the op-
portunity of employers to deny job security under the FRA.
For instance, if a sales manager takes family leave, under
federal standards, when that manager returns from leave,
she is entitled to a sales management position. Although she
may not be managing the same people as before taking leave,
if she manages a group which is selling the same products at
the same location, the job is "equivalent." Under the Califor-
nia law, however, the same sales manager may be reinstated
to a "comparable" management position in the personnel de-
partment. Employers will argue the positions are compara-
ble in that both positions involve management supervision of
the same number of people with the same salary and benefits.
Such an argument has potential validity because both jobs
are at a similar level and require similar management skills,
though the two jobs are also arguably polar. For instance, a
sales manager may be required to ensure her employees
achieve a particular quota each month and develop a rela-
237. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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tionship with outside clients. A personnel manager, on the
other hand, may deal only with internal issues involving hir-
ing decisions and compensation disputes, never having con-
tact with the outside customer. The problem lies in the fact
that an employee does not know the guidelines for "compara-
ble" jobs, so she cannot be secure in her reinstatement upon
taking leave. Further, if guidelines exist, "comparability," at
some level, will require a subjective opinion to determine
whether the reinstatement position is sufficiently "compara-
ble". This uncertainty may lead to reluctance in taking leave,
ultimately resulting in the degradation of family values.
Considering the hypothetical situation once again, as-
sume the employer reinstated the employee who took leave
under the FRA to an identical sales management position,
but in a different location, fifteen miles further from home
than her pre-leave job. Employers will argue that this man-
agement position is, despite the extra fifteen miles, "compara-
ble." If this extra distance requires commuting through a
major city, increasing daily commuting time by an hour, how-
ever, the position may not meet the comparability standard.
The problem is that issues such as these may not be decided
until after leave is taken by one who will have her own biases
as to what geographic disparities are "comparable," such as
whether actual commute time, as opposed to distance, should
be a factor in that determination. Also unclear is the weight
certain similarities and differences should be assigned. In
the hypothetical situation, for example, the longer commute
may or may not be outweighed by restoration to the same
pre-leave position.
"Comparability" or "similarity," is like a spectrum, which
can be realized at many different points, depending on one's
point of view and the criteria compared. As a result, employ-
ees may be reluctant to risk an unfavorable, pro-employer in-
terpretation of a standard which would be less favorable than
that achieved under the federal "equivalency" standard.
When the "equivalent" position is explicitly guaranteed, job
security is more certain because objectivity is maximized.
The federal law provides that if its law is more favorable
to the employee than a state's laws, then the FMLA will ap-
ply.2 39 It is unclear, however, if federal law in a particular
239. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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case actually will be more favorable because a position may
be so "comparable" that it is also "equivalent." To avoid this
uncertainty, confusion between these two laws must be
reconciled.
The legislative history of the EPA illustrates Congres-
sional awareness of how legal dangers in using the word
"comparable" rather than "equal" can manifest themselves in
application. Initial pay equity statutes mandated equal pay
for comparable work, which resulted in employment boards
and courts defining comparability in different ways, creating
various standards, none of which was predictable, uniform, or
objective.240 The EPA, as ultimately passed, offered these
qualities by substituting the word "comparable" for
"equivalent," because "comparable" does not assure true
equality.241
Although "comparability" may be consistent with other
principles reflected in work-related legislation,2 42 it is not
helpful where the central objective is pay equity or where the
work results in subjective and divisive issues regarding the
intrinsic value of particular jobs.243 Similarly, in family leave
legislation, the central objective is reinstatement to the same
job she was in prior to leave, and, alternatively, a job as close
as possible in all respects to that original job. With this goal,
the legislation should be as clear as possible in its drafting.
As one representative said in the EPA proceedings, "[i]f, in
fact, we want to establish equal pay for equal work, then we
ought to say so."244 Similarly, if, in fact, job security through
reinstatement is the goal, then restoration to an equivalent
position ought to be undisputed.
The goal in family leave legislation is job security,245 not
an intrinsic comparison between other types of jobs which
may be more convenient for the employer. A fundamental
problem acknowledged when drafting the EPA was that,
"'comparability' gave such latitude [to employers] in applica-
tion that the main purpose of the bill is destroyed."246
240. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
242. Rhode, supra note 109, at 1233-35.
243. Id. at 1233-35.
244. 108 CONG. REC. 14768 (statement of Rep. Goodell).
245. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
246. 108 CONG. REC. 14771 (statement of Rep. Goodell).
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Equivalency, by definition, requires an objective comparison,
which will give certainty to employees who take family leave.
The "comparability" standard of the FRA is not the only
provision which undermines the purpose of the laws. The key
employee exemption poses additional threats to harmony be-
tween job security and family caretaking.
C. Gender Inequality and the Key Employee Exemption
Both the FMLA and FRA contain a provision which pro-
vides that those employees who are compensated in the top
ten percent of the businesses situated within a seventy-five
mile radius may be denied reinstatement after taking leave if
the employer can show "substantial and grievous economic
injury" would result.24 7
In effect, this provision forces those who are in this pay
range to choose between family and job security. The adverse
effect on career women is twofold. First of all, women who
are in this pay range will be forced to choose between family
and job security, which will further stunt female advance-
ment up the corporate ladder. Second, career wives whose
husbands are in the top ten percent of their company's pay
scale will be the spouses to take leave because of the unwill-
ingness to jeopardize the job security of their highly compen-
sated husbands. As a result, the wives of these husbands,
248 1tael
who will likely be in lower pay ranges, will take leave, thus
perpetuating the traditional and outdated "women at home"
mentality,249 causing them to set aside their own career.
These women will "forego promotional and training opportu-
nities.., which makes advancement within the high paying
sector more difficult."2 50 As a result, women as a whole will
remain grouped in lower level positions, as is presently the
case.251 This problem is exacerbated when the undefined
"substantial and grievous economic injury" guideline is con-
sidered. Each of these issues is discussed in turn.
247. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
248. RHODE, supra note 120, at 167.
249. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
251. RHODE, supra note 120, at 161.
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1. Adverse Affect on Women who are Highly
Compensated
Women will be adversely affected by the key employee
exemption because females who do make it to the top finan-
cially will have to make a choice between work and family, an
undesirable choice which compelled the passage of both stat-
utes.25 2 Women have a difficult time reaching upper pay-
ranges,253 and so few women are at the top254 that once they
are, forcing them to make a choice between work and family
will only perpetuate gender inequality L he workplace.
Although the discrimination may be inadvertent, 5 5 the effect
is the same as if the discrimination was intentional.
Because of the nature of roles of men and women in our
society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often
falls on women,25 6 and this responsibility generally affects
their lives to a greater degree.257 Consequently, women who
achieve economic success in the male-dominated professional
world are often still the family caregivers.258 Upon achieving
such success, family leave laws, as written, cease to fully pro-
tect these women, and either their role as a caretaker or busi-
nesswoman is jeopardized. Once these women reach the top
ten percent, job security is no longer an unconditional guar-
antee. In the wake of breakthroughs in obviating traditional
expectations of women, the traditional roles have not auto-
matically ceased to exist.2 5 9 Instead, women today must
manage careers in addition to the family caregiving role, even
if those women are highly compensated. 26 0 "[The] problem of
reconciling work with parenting is a woman's greatest prob-
lem with respect to eliminating discrimination."2 61
252. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
253. Rhode, supra note 109, at 1236.
254. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
259. RHODE, supra note 120, at 172.
260. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 351016
FAMILY LEAVE LEGISLATION
2. Adverse Affect on Women whose Spouses are Highly
Compensated
Another problem arises from the ten percent exemption.
Those working women whose husband's compensation falls
within the top 10% pay range will not take family leave be-
cause of the unwillingness to jeopardize the job security and
economic security of their family.262 The female spouse will
take leave when economic circumstances compel her to do
so,263 because her reinstatement, rather than her husband's
is unconditionally ensured under the family leave laws, as-
suming she is in a lower paid position. Indeed, when the 10%
provision applies, this will most likely be the situation, as
studies reveal that "at the highest levels of professional and
financial achievement, significant disparities [between men
and women] have remained."264 Therefore, wives who are not
in the highest compensated positions will, in effect, be forced
to take leave if their highly compensated spouses are within
the perimeters of this provision. In this sense, the main rea-
son for making the bill gender-neutral, to encourage men to
take a more active role in family caretaking,2 6 5 is severely
undercut.
The effects of the provision in this situation are perhaps
more damaging because of their subtlety and persistence.
First, women who are, in effect, forced to take leave instead
of their husbands will perpetuate the traditional roles women
have played.266 The message conveyed is that if a man and a
woman both have careers, and a family situation arises, it is
the duty of the lower-paid spouse to be the caretaker.
The FRA and FMLA, however, do use gender-neutral
terms, an approach which recognizes that men can and
should share caregiving responsibilities. 267 In determining
whether a statute promotes equality, the relevant question to
262. The author acknowledges and believes that the problem discussed in
this section is equally problematic where a husband's wife falls within the key
employee exemption and her husband does not. This comment discusses the
problem from the other perspective, however, simply because statistics demon-
strate that, in most cases, men will be more likely than women to be subject to
the key employee exemption. The focus here is on the detrimental effect the
exemption has on the lower-compensated spouse.
263. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
265. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 2, at 29.
266. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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ask is "whether the law substantively encourages and sup-
ports the overall integration of women's and men's roles in
both the family and the workplace-in their responsibilities
as parents and in their development through work."2 68
Additionally, a woman who takes leave because her hus-
band is not guaranteed job security under the family leave
laws is forced to forego an opportunity for personal career ad-
vancement.269 As a result, women remain clustered in infer-
ior positions. ° Women who do not advance under these
types of circumstances become "frustrated and opt for differ-
ent employment, confirm[ing] the adverse stereotypes that
had worked against their advancement in the first
instance."27 '
In order to equalize the workforce and caretaking respon-
sibilities, indirect problems must be recognized and recon-
ciled. The purpose of the family leave laws is to create a bal-
ance by providing both job security and family values.2 72 The
legal response has been gender-neutral: to allow women and
men to take family leave. To accomplish this objective, how-
ever, it must be equally economically prudent for either
spouse to take family medical leave. 273 The 10% provision
creates the potential of being denied job security by choosing
family. This is a chance most families cannot afford to take.
Ultimately, even though women are making advances in
the professional world, men continue to be in the most power-
ful and highly compensated positions. Advancement criteria,
too, have been defined by power and economic status.274 Do-
mestic responsibilities, however, are clearly still occupied by
women a majority of the time.2 7 5 Legislation, such as family
leave laws, have the potential to play a role in eliminating
these biased structures and inequalities through proper
drafting which addresses the structure of the workplace
itself.
The only way to equalize work and caretaking responsi-
bility within the family unit is to have family leave laws
268. Wright-Carozza, supra note 121, at 582.
269. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
271. RHODE, supra note 120, at 172.
272. See supra note 1-2 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
274. RHODE, supra note 120, at 169.
275. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
1018 [Vol. 35
FAMILY LEAVE LEGISLATION
whose provisions truly allow either spouse to take leave with-
out jeopardizing job security. Progress toward gender equal-
ity in the workplace is being made.276 Consequently, the un-
derlying effects of provisions of employment laws which have
the potential of curtailing this progress must be stopped. The
adverse effects of the key employee exemption are increased
by the standard under which it may be invoked.
3. Problems With the "Substantial and Grievous
Economic Injury" Guideline
For employees in these top pay ranges, job security under
family leave laws is eviscerated by the guidelines given to de-
termine whether an employer may deny reinstatement to its
highest compensated employees. The standard, "substantial
and grievous economic injury" potentially includes a broad
range of situations, depending on one's perspective and inter-
pretation. For example, a sharp plunge in a company's stock
value may indicate "substantial and grievous economic in-
jury" to some employers and a predictable setback to others.
It is unclear whether the harm shown must be perma-
nent, temporary, or exist for a particular amount of time
before it will be found sufficiently "substantial." Further, if
the economic harm results from negligent mismanagement
decisions, it is contestable that employers should be able to
rely on such substantial mistakes to their benefit under fam-
ily leave laws and deny reinstatement to highly compensated
employees who have taken family leave.
Also, the laws suggest no criteria by which economic
hardship can be measured and adjudged "grievous." For in-
stance, one could take into account stock value, asset value,
or departmental budgets and reach completely different con-
clusions. Leaving decisions to different judges and employ-
ment boards when no statutory benchmark exists will cause
inconsistency and insecurity for the highest compensated
employees.
As has been demonstrated, potential for serious problems
in application of the 10% provisions of the family leave laws
exists, and the standards provided to determine when this
provision can be activated create no means for evenhanded
276. RHODE, supra note 120, at 161.
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application. Finally, there a provision under the family leave
laws potentially threatens employee privacy rights.
D. Reconciling Employee Privacy and the Fitness-For-Duty
Certification
Under the FMLA and FRA, an employee who takes leave
for personal illness may be required, as a matter of company
policy, to provide fitness-for-duty certification as a condition
for reinstatement.27 7 This provision has the potential to
needlessly sacrifice employee privacy.
When an employee takes leave, she is required under
leave laws to obtain certification. 278 That certification, how-
ever, need not reveal the nature of the employee's illness, just
that her condition prevents her from performing her job at
that time.2 7 9 In theory, the leave time equals the period
needed to remedy that inability. Employers, at this point,
have no reasonable basis for believing an employee returning
from leave cannot perform her job.
Essentially, employees who take leave for a personal con-
dition sacrifice their privacy rights to a certain degree. They
have the burden of proving through the certification process
that they cannot work for a specific period of time.280 Privacy
rights are sacrificed to the extent that the leave period is
granted. On taking leave, employees are being certified to
prove they cannot perform their job for a certain time period.
In taking personal family leave, no presumption is to be made
that an employee cannot do her job after that period. Requir-
ing employees to go through fitness-for-duty certification,
which may include medical examinations and tests, requires
an additional, independent analysis of employee privacy
rights. Employees only sacrifice their privacy expectations to
a degree for the purposes of a leave period they affirmatively
choose to take. Once the period ends, an employee's full pri-
vacy expectations are restored.
Fitness-for-duty policies allow employers to force employ-
ees who have taken leave because of personal illness to sub-
mit to medical examinations and tests without first demon-
strating a legitimate belief that the employee cannot perform
277. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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her job. Theoretically, the employer does not even know the
exact nature of the employee's condition. 2 11 Employers
should not be able to take advantage of an employee's previ-
ous reasonable belief that she cannot work to justify their
own belief at a later date that an employee cannot work sim-
ply because she took leave, forcing the employee to affirma-
tively prove she can work via a medical exam before having
an on-the-job opportunity to prove she can. At this point, re-
assessment of employee privacy interests and employer con-
cerns must be considered before invasion of that interest.
The fitness-for-duty provision, in effect, runs counter to
the intent behind family leave laws. Those who need to take
leave may be deterred from doing so because fitness-for-duty
needlessly threatens job security. Family leave laws seek to
promote family values and job security while taking only em-
ployers' legitimate concerns into account. 28 2 Here, employers
have no reason to believe an employee returning from leave
cannot perform her job because they have not seen her work.
There are, however, conceivable situations where the balance
between privacy and employer's independence tips in favor of
a fitness-for-duty examination. Drug testing in the work-
place provides an enlightening analogy to this tension.
Because drug testing is a "search" for privacy con-
cerns,28 3 arguably physical examinations and tests which
may be required to obtain a fitness-for-duty exam should be
considered searches as well. California courts recognize an
even stronger privacy right than the federal courts because
the right is explicitly granted in California's Constitution.28 4
Even private employers must respect employee privacy
rights.28 5 The FRA, then, must also comply with established
privacy guidelines in enforcement.
With certain exceptions, random drug testing in the
workplace has been held an unconstitutional violation of an
employee's privacy rights.2 6 To preserve employee privacy
rights, yet accommodate employer interest in a safe and
drug-free workplace, two general rules of application have
281. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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been established by the courts and advocated in many
articles.
First, because privacy is a fundamental right, any viola-
tion of that right will be subject to strict scrutiny by the
courts.28 7 Courts have held that employers do have a compel-
ling interest in preventing drug abuse in the workplace.28 8
Consequently, employers may force an employee to submit to
a urine test if they can show they have a reasonable belief
that the employee is abusing drugs.28 9 The employer has the
burden of proof to show why such an invasion into the em-
ployee's privacy is justified, a burden which requires specific,
objective facts and rational inferences in order to avoid poten-
tial bias.29 °
Currently, the FRA and FMLA do not set similar stan-
dards for employers who invade their employee's privacy
rights by forcing them to present a medical certificate before
any indication that the employee will not be able to perform
her job upon returning from family leave. Further, there is
nothing to suggest that employers have never previously en-
tertained such a belief, since it is the employee whose affirm-
ative action activates the family leave process in the first
place. Fitness-for-duty exams allow employers to bootstrap
their belief to the employee's pre-leave belief, invading the
employee's fundamental right to privacy without shouldering
any burden of proof. Employers cannot form such a belief un-
less they first evaluate post-leave performance because the
employee should be presumed recovered when she returns to
work.
The other general rule is that drug testing is allowed in
the workplace where there is a legitimate safety concern on
the part of the employer if danger in the work environment is
increased by drug use.29 1 Here, employee drug testing and
the privacy issues involved have been found outweighed by
the employer's safety interest.292 Safety, however, is not an
unsubstantiated excuse employers' can use for violating pri-
vacy rights and forcing drug testing. Case law has developed
287. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 296, 198 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 188, 195, 202 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 199, 207 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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several criteria for determining whether an employer has a
legitimate interest in drug testing. The legality of testing de-
pends on job descriptions, the immediacy of the threat to
safety, and the nature of the employee's job.293 Further,
there must be a direct nexus between job safety and drug
use.2 94 Significantly, the employer bears the burden of prov-
ing the necessity of invading its employee's privacy rights in
the interest of safety.295 The stringent standard for employ-
ers maximizes privacy interests, while realizing that with re-
spect to certain jobs, employers' have valid reasons for ob-
taining personal information.
Family leave legislation, however, although allowing an
invasion of one's privacy rights, does not place such an excep-
tion in the fitness-for-duty provision. As a result, employers
are entitled to place a blanket requirement on the entire com-
pany, subjecting employees, whose health poses no safety
risks, to medical exams as a condition for returning to work.
Such a provision, in effect, refuses to acknowledge that while
some people may sacrifice some measure of privacy due to the
nature of their jobs, it is unacceptable that everyone's rights
automatically be forfeited.
For instance, the court held in Luck v. Southern Pacific
Transportation that, although an employee works for a rail-
road company, a business where the legality of random drug
testing is allowed as a safety precaution for some positions, a
computer programmer for that company is not in such a posi-
tion.296 Consequently, drug testing in this situation, without
a reasonable belief of abuse on the job, is a privacy violation.
In Semore v. Pool, the court held that it was impossible weigh
employer and employee interests unless it is familiar with
the nature of the particular employee's job.297 Not only does
such a policy provide consistency and protection, but also no-
tice to employees who have unsafe jobs. Thus, a balance is
struck in the legislation which favors employee rights and job
security, while taking the reasonable concerns of the em-
ployer into account. Coincidentally, these are also the objec-
tives of family leave legislation.
293. See supra note 165-66 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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IV. PROPOSAL
This comment proposes three changes to the California
FRA, which will conform it to the employee-favorable intent
of the legislature, and acknowledge the challenge of the
FMLA to pass more favorable legislation than its own. All of
these proposals are intended to solidify the purpose of family
leave legislation: the strengthening of the family unit without
jeopardizing job security. Although FRA provisions generally
accomplish this purpose, realization of these proposals would
ensure further security and, in turn, strengthen families for
employees.
This comment proposes the following changes to the Cali-
fornia FRA:
1) Reinstatement to the "same" or "equivalent" position:
To absolutely ensure job security to an employee who takes
family leave, the standard must be statutorily unequivocal.
The "equivalence" standard requires objectivity in applica-
tion, thus reinstatement is guaranteed before leave is taken.
Consequently, the FRA should be amended to provide that an
employee returning from family leave must be restored to the
"same" position of employment held prior to leave or to an
"equivalent" position, with equivalent job functions, salary,
and responsibilities.
2) Key employee exemption deleted: To ensure job secur-
ity to all employees who take family leave, the 10% key em-
ployee exemption should be stricken from the laws. An em-
ployee who takes family leave should be restored to the
"same" or "equivalent" position regardless of her rate of
compensation.
3) Fitness-for-duty provision modified: Recognizing that
employees have constitutional privacy rights which are not
forfeited upon taking medical leave, the provision allowing
employers to require recertification upon return from leave
should be modified. The following proposal is designed to bal-
ance both an employee's privacy rights and an employer's le-
gitimate interests in job safety and quality of job
performance:
i) Where there is no safety risk in the employee's job:
An employee who returns from leave under the FRA
due to personal illness should not be required to sub-
mit to a fitness-for-duty examination unless her em-
ployer can show a reasonable belief that she is not ad-
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equately performing her job functions. The standard
for proving that a reasonable belief exists should re-
quire the employer to point to specific instances
where job performance has been deficient. Only after
such a standard is met should an employee have to
present fitness-for-duty certification to her employer.
Absent a reasonable belief, privacy interests of the
employee should prevail and no recertification process
should be required.
ii) Where there is a safety risk inherent in the nature
of the employee's job: When an employee who takes
family leave is in a position where performance of
that job poses an inherent safety risk to herself or
others, an employee's privacy interests are reasonably
outweighed by her employer's safety concerns. In
these situations, an employee who takes family leave
should be required to present fitness-for-duty certifi-
cation if her employer's policy so mandates. Deter-
mining whether such a safety risk is present, how-
ever, must depend on the nature of that individual
employee's job rather than the nature of the em-
ployer's business in general. This way, employee pri-
vacy rights are maximized while legitimate employer
concerns are satisfied.
VI. CONCLUSION
Family leave laws represent legislative response to the
changing dynamics in the workplace. The ultimate goal is to
help employees participate in certain medical and family sit-
uations without the risk of job loss. If this is accomplished,
job security and family values can successfully co-exist. For
the most part, the amended California Family Rights Act of
1991 reflects this goal. There are, however, provisions in the
current legislation which undermine this purpose. These
provisions should be modified to meet the federal challenge to
pass legislation more favorable to the employee.
The family leave laws are written for the employee and
must be interpreted as such. If not, employees will not take
leave, and the very values the laws seek to promote will be
jeopardized. It is imperative, therefore, to discuss how these
laws will work in practice and to correct ambiguities and fore-
seeable problems before they arise. Uncertainty is not secur-
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ity. This comment has shown how the "comparability" stan-
dard, the key employee exemption, and the fitness-for-duty
certification impair sought after job security when family val-
ues are realized. Consequently, the proposals, if effectuated,
would make it possible for all employees to take advantage of
family leave without the fear of being restored to a job they
did not expect, of not being restored at all, of not having a
true choice on whether to take leave, and of unfairly sacrific-
ing privacy rights. In order to truly promote family values
without sacrificing job security, these problems must be
resolved.
Amy Olsen
